Dependency/Termination of Parental Rights - In re T.P. 747 N.W.2d 356 (Minn. 2008).

Daycare providers and family members, including Mother, began noticing bruising on the child, then five months old. Father admitted that the child was in his direct care when the injuries occurred. Father explained that the child rolled off the bed into a dresser. However, the pediatrician who examined the child testified that the parallel bruising pattern correlated to handprint or finger marks. The physician also testified that the child suffered "classic metaphysical fractures" to her left wrist and ankle, most likely attributed to shaking, twisting, or bending of the limbs.

The district court terminated Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their daughter under the Egregious Harm Provision of the Minnesota Child Protection Statute, holding that in light of the harm experienced by the child, it was contrary to her best interests to be in her parents’ care. The court of appeals affirmed.

The Minnesota Egregious Harm Provision (Minn. Stat. § 260C.007, subd. 1(b)(6)) states that a court may terminate parental rights if it finds "a child has experienced egregious harm in the parent’s care which is of a nature, duration, or chronicity that indicates a lack of regard for the child’s wellbeing, such that a reasonable person would believe it contrary to the best interest of the child to be in the parent’s care."

Mother appealed, arguing that the district court erred in terminating her parental rights because the child was in the sole care of Father when her daughter suffered the egregious harm. Mother contended that the Egregious Harm Provision should be interpreted strictly to require that injury to a child occur at the hands of or in the physical presence of a parent.

The issue before the Court was to determine the meaning of the Egregious Harm Provision’s undefined and unexplained phrase "in the parent’s care."

The Child Protection Statute uses the term "care" in other termination provisions. Subsection 1(b)(2) permits termination of the rights of a parent who has failed to provide the child with "necessary food, clothing, shelter, education, and other care and control." Subsection 1(b)(4) permits termination of the rights of a parent who is unable to "care appropriately for the ongoing physical, mental, or emotional needs of the child." The Court concluded that these provisions indicate a legislative intent that the term "care" be used as a broad reference to legal or physical custody. Care includes parental provision for the well-being of a child in ways that do not require physical presence.

Therefore, because the child’s fractures and facial bruising occurred when Mother and Father’s relationship was intact, the child resided with both parents, and Mother acknowledged that she and Father were the child’s primary caretakers, the record supported the district court’s finding that the child was in Mother’s care when the egregious harm occurred.

The Court further interpreted the provision’s language and found that termination of parental rights requires more than a child experiencing egregious harm in the parent’s care. It also requires a finding that the harm "indicates a lack of regard for the child’s wellbeing." Where a parent has not personally inflicted the egregious harm, it is impossible for the "nature, duration, or chronicity" of that harm to indicate a lack of regard for the child’s well-being unless the parent was aware of the harm and its cause. Hence, to terminate the rights of a parent who has not personally harmed the child, a court must first find that the parent either knew or should have known that the child experienced the harm.

Because none of the district court’s findings addressed the "knew or should have known" standard, the Court reversed the court of appeals’ affirmation of the termination of Mother’s parental rights and remanded the case to the district court.